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Cyberterrorism Today? 
Findings from a follow-on survey of researchers 
This article reports on a survey of researchers designed to capture current perspectives 
on core questions around cyberterrorism. The survey – conducted in 2017 as a follow-
on to an initial, 2012, exercise - focused on questions of definition, threat and response. 
By documenting our findings in each of these areas – and highlighting developments in 
the years between our surveys – we identify three particularly important trends. First, 
an increasing convergence around the core characteristics of cyberterrorism, albeit with 
continuing conceptual disagreements at the concept’s penumbra. Second, increasing 
researcher concern with the threat posed by cyberterrorism, underpinned by a 
widespread view that this threat has increased, and a growing feeling that cyberterrorist 
attacks have now taken place. Third, support for a diversity of counter-measures to this 
threat, although perhaps counter-intuitively little suggestion that resort to exceptional 
or draconian measures is needed. In order to inform future research, the article 
concludes by detailing some of the major limitations, gaps and weaknesses within 
academic research to date as identified by our respondents. 
Keywords: cyberterrorism; cyber terrorism; cybersecurity; terrorism; survey 
Introduction 
In March 2019, a coordinated attack on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand led to the 
deaths of fifty people. The shootings had a significant impact beyond their immediate victims 
– even as they unfolded – due to the attacker, Brenton Harrison Tarrant, having “live-
streamed footage of his rampage to Facebook, filmed with a head-mounted camera.”1 This 
use of digital technologies for the live communication of an attack was not qualitatively new: 
assailants in an earlier, 2013, attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, for 
example, had done similar via the social media platform, Twitter.2 Tarrant’s actions, 
however, served to re-center media and public attention on the relationship between terrorism 
and cyber-technologies, in this instance as a mechanism for propagandizing one’s violences. 
As one well-known journalist put it shortly afterwards: “Technology is terrorism’s most 
effective ally. It delivers a global audience.”3 Such concerns around the use of 
cybertechnologies to produce, or augment, security threats, of course, continue to exercise 
policy communities too. On the very day that the Christchurch shootings were unfolding, no 
less, media sources in Britain and beyond were also reporting the UK National Audit Office’s 
admonishment of the British government’s failure to protect national critical infrastructure 
from future cyber-attacks.4 
In 2012, members of the Cyberterrorism Project set out to explore the prominence or 
lack thereof of such concerns amongst academics and researchers working in this field. 
Drawing inspiration from important earlier efforts to snapshot the terrorism research 
community, a survey was conducted focusing on researcher understandings of the meaning of 
cyberterrorism, the threat that it poses, and the appropriate responses to this threat. Key 
findings from this survey – considered further detail below – included: the existence of 
widespread support for a specific, stand-alone definition of cyberterrorism – albeit with 
considerable disagreement on the appropriate content of such a definition;5 researcher 
skepticism about the proliferation and value of adjacent terms – especially ‘cyber jihad’ or 
‘pure cyberterrorism’ – in this context;6 evidence of a pronounced and important divide 
between “skeptical” and “concerned” perspectives on the threat posed by cyberterrorism;7 
and, some sympathy for the validity of the proposition that states are capable of engaging in 
cyberterrorism.8 
In the years that have now passed since that initial exercise, we have witnessed two 
developments of relevance to those interested in cyberterrorism. The first is a series of events 
that might be understood as instances of – or, more cautiously, evidence of the threat posed 
by – the phenomenon of cyberterrorism. Such events include the Wannacry ransomware 
attack, which was subsequently estimated to have disrupted 1 percent of all UK National 
Health Service care over the course of a full week, generating a financial cost of £92million.9 
Other prominent examples have included Kaspersky’s 2012 discovery of the ‘Red October’ 
virus, a 2015 attack on TV 5Monde by the ‘Cybercaliphate’, and the 2017 attacks on 
Ukrainian targets through the malware Petya. The second is a continuing growth in 
scholarship on ‘cyberterrorism’ and related threats, which is indicative of escalating research 
interest in this area. The importance of these developments encouraged the research team 
behind the initial survey to repeat our survey of researchers ‘five years on’. Doing so, we 
demonstrate below, enables exploration of epistemic (dis)continuity across this eventful 
period: facilitating reflection on the impact, if any, of these events upon research 
perspectives, views and paradigms. This, in turn, provides opportunity for considering the 
first survey’s reliability, and to capitalize on feedback received on our earlier effort by 
adding, removing or reframing specific questions as appropriate. Thus, as detailed further 
below, the 2017 survey included 12 repeated questions, 4 reformulated questions and 4 new 
questions.  Finally, by attempting to survey the academic field as constituted in 2017 – rather 
than simply returning to our original respondents – the follow-up survey also takes account of 
this research community’s fluidity, recognizing that topics such as cyberterrorism are 
characterized by the emergence of new researchers, research interests, questions and 
paradigms.  
In this article we trace key findings from the 2017 survey based around three themes: 
definitions, threat assessments, and proposed solutions to cyberterrorism. We offer three 
arguments. First, although there are continuing – and important – conceptual disagreements 
around this term, there appears also to exist some convergence around cyberterrorism’s core 
characteristics. Second, our surveys also indicate a growing scholarly concern that the threat 
posed by cyberterrorism is increasing over time. Third, we show– perhaps counter-intuitively 
– that this growing sense of threat is not accompanied by increasing support for exceptional 
or draconian responses. Our evaluation of continuity and change in these areas is, of course, 
limited to the comparison of two static moments separated by five years, and therefore unable 
to explore trends in the intervening period (much less predict the continuation of these trends 
into the future). It does, however, offer the fullest evaluation to date of perspectives within 
the global research community around these and related questions.  
Recent developments in cyberterrorism research 
In the period since our first survey of researchers, there has been a notable increase in 
scholarship around cyberterrorism and related cybersecurity issues. Much of this work 
continues the focus of earlier scholarship around three big questions: the definition of 
cyberterrorism, the threat of cyberterrorism, and the issue of how (or how not) to respond to 
this threat.10 
To summarize briefly, discussion of definitional issues continues to demonstrate the 
contestability of this term, highlighting the confusion and disagreement that surrounds its 
usage.11 Early reference points within this debate have become, if anything, more prominent 
with frequent mention made, first, of Barry Collin’s purported coining of this term,12 and, 
second, of Dorothy Denning’s testimony to the House Armed Services Committee’s Special 
Oversight Panel on Terrorism in 2000, from which the most widely-used understanding of 
this term emerges. Recent interventions, however, do include specific attempts at definition, 
with the following illustrative of these: “In contrast to conventional terrorism, cyberterrorism 
employs malicious computer technology rather than kinetic force. But like conventional 
terrorism, cyberterrorism aims to further political, religious, or ideological goals by harming 
civilians physically or psychologically”13; and, “Cyberterrorism is the ability of terrorists to 
conduct terrorist actions in cyberspace with the intent of creating violence and destruction on 
or even death of its target”14; and, “Cyberterrorism commonly implies prohibited assaults and 
hazards against computer systems, computer networks, and the Internet.”15  
Complementary interventions within the contemporary literature offer conceptual 
clarification by situating cyberterrorism within typologies of cybersecurity challenges,16 or by 
focusing on specific instantiations of this phenomenon such as “lone actor cyberterrorism,”17 
or “ideologically motivated cyberattacks performed by far left groups.”18 There has also, 
importantly, been a growth of critical reflection around the language of cyberterrorism. This 
includes more pronounced attention to the politics of this terminology and its application to 
various forms of online activism,19 and analyses of the lexicon’s usage by various actors, 
especially political executives.20 These reflections build on earlier reflections 
oncyberterrorism discourse,21 while speaking also to contemporary debate on the utility of the 
‘cyber’ prefix more broadly.22 
Recent work on the threat of cyberterrorism is confronted by the two main challenges 
of earlier discussion: the conceptual confusion considered above, and a lack of 
uncontroversial instances of this threat’s realization. Thus, while some case study work 
attempts to document examples of this phenomenon,23 one remains as likely – in the recent 
literature – to find: assertions of threat via analogical reasoning, e.g. “The recent successes of 
hacktivists, however, do highlight the potential threat of cyberterrorism in that a few 
individuals with little to no moral restraint may use methods similar to hackers to wreak 
havoc, generate fear, and cause severe injury or death”;24 exercises simulating the 
consequences of cyberterrorism;25 or, speculative projections of this threat’s future severity, 
for instance:  
it can be assumed that in the offensive sphere, global jihad organizations are able to 
cause significant damage in a short period of time by receiving services or information 
from international criminal organizations and/or terror-supporting states. While 
developing cyber-attack capabilities may require some time in terms of developing 
malwares and training skilled hackers, purchasing these capabilities online can be done 
instantly; also, with the support of financial resources as well as manpower from terror-
supporting states, cyber-terrorism attacks pose an imminent threat.26 
Where some of this literature succumbs to the temptation of worst-case scenarios – “potential 
gains from a successful attack for terrorists could be substantial, ranging from stealing money 
to fund terrorist actions to crashing national, even global financial markets”27 – more 
skeptical perspectives highlight significant governmental attention to cybersecurity,28 and the 
risk of threat exaggeration in this relatively ill-understood domain.29 Although a longstanding 
concern with the resilience of critical infrastructures remains a key focus of this scholarship 
on threat,30 more expansive discussions of the terrorism/internet nexus concentrate upon the 
propagandistic uses of digital technologies by organizations such as al Qaeda and, especially, 
Daesh.31 
A third prominent theme in contemporary scholarship is the viability of various 
measures for countering cyberterrorism. Legally-oriented work here explores the regulation 
of internet technologies, often with a focus on the challenges of divergent national 
jurisdictions and a limited framework of international law.32 Related research complements 
this with an emphasis on the political challenges confronting the global governance of 
cybersecurity threats.33 At a more micro-level, scholarship has also begun to explore the 
preparedness and resilience of individuals – either as citizens or as employees of significant 
institutions – to potential cyberattack.34 Although, as Futter notes, enhancing individual 
computer hygiene might be more appropriate for high-frequency, low-level incidents35 than 
for the more catastrophic scenarios to which discussion on cyberterrorism is often drawn. 
Discussion continues too, finally, on the feasibility of deterrence in a realm characterized by 
attribution difficulties, for instance with Klein arguing: 
Because there appears to be a persistent desire by some terrorist organizations to use any 
and all means, including cyberattacks, to achieve their desired goals, it is paramount for 
policy makers and military planners to take preparatory actions to prevent such acts and 
mitigate any effects should such an attack occur. These preparatory actions include 
deterrence efforts.36 
Methodology 
The findings discussed in this article draw from two surveys distributed electronically, in 
2012 and 2017 respectively, with different purposive sampling approaches utilized in both 
instances as described below. The purposive approach was best placed to identify potential 
respondents from our population of interest – members of the global research community 
working in the area of cyberterrorism – but as a non-probability approach we cannot and do 
not make claims about the statistical representativeness of our findings. The research 
community around cyberterrorism is, of course, a dynamic and porous one for which no 
objective identification of membership is possible. It has also, of course, changed in the five 
years between our surveys.  On top of this, our own backgrounds within specific social 
scientific disciplines (Political Science, Law and Communication Science), for instance, may 
have skewed our sample, as may other factors such as our residence in the UK and US. 
2012 Sampling Approach 
The initial survey was distributed to over 600 identified members of the global research 
community. Members of this community were identified via four key sampling strategies. 
First, via a targeted literature review to identify researchers who have published specifically 
on cyberterrorism within peer-reviewed journals, monographs, edited books, or other 
literature. The review focused upon the main catalogue of the British Library and 47 other 
online databases (including JSTOR, Oxford Journals online, SAGE journals online, Wiley 
Interscience, Springer Link, IEEE Xplore, Lecture Notes in Computer Science and Zetoc).37 
The search was limited to publications since 2004.  
This review was complemented, second, by active researchers working on terrorism 
more broadly – identified via recent publication of articles in, and the editorial boards of, the 
following journals: Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, 
Perspectives on Terrorism, and Critical Studies on Terrorism. These include the two most 
established journals for terrorism research and (in the latter two) two more recent additions. 
Taken together they represent the conceptual and methodological breadth within terrorism 
research today. The third sampling strategy was via a “snowball method” in which potential 
respondents were identified by individuals who completed the survey. And, finally, targeted 
requests for respondents were disseminated via the mailing lists of two UK-based academic 
organizations: the Terrorism and Political Violence Association and the British International 
Studies Association Critical Studies on Terrorism Working Group. 
2017 Sampling Approach 
For the 2017 survey we replicated the first three of the sampling strategies used in 2012: a 
targeted literature review; invitations to active researchers on terrorism, identified via 
publication of articles in, and the editorial boards of, the four identified journals; and, the 
snowball method. In respect of the fourth strategy, instead of using the mailing lists of the 
same organizations as in 2012 we used the mailing list of the Cyberterrorism Project. This 
mailing list included a number of the respondents to the 2012 survey as well as others 
familiar with our research in the intervening years.  
Sample 
The 2017 survey generated a total of 120 complete and 4 partial responses from researchers 
working in 30 countries across 5 continents: this represents a small increase from the 118 
responses across 24 countries and 6 continents in 2012. And, as in 2012, our survey 
demonstrates a similar weighting towards the Anglosphere, with 43 respondents (34.7%) 
working in the United States (2012: n. 41; 35.0%); 21 (16.9%) in the United Kingdom (2012: 
n. 32; 27.4%), 8 in Australia (6.5%; 2012: n. 7; 6.0%) and 6 in Canada (4.8%; 2012: n. 4; 
3.4%). Of our respondents, 89 identified as permanent members of academic staff (71.8%; 
2012: n. 75; 63.6%); 15 as independent researchers (12.1 %; 2012: n. 11; 9.3%); and 5 as 
research students (4.0%; 2012: 9; 7.6%). On disciplinary background, finally, our sample 
described themselves thus: Political Science/International Relations: 52 (46.0%; 2012: n. 69; 
50.4%); Engineering/Computer Science/Cyber: 18 (15.9%; 2012: n. 17; 12.4%); 
Psychology/Anthropology: 15 (13.3%; 2012: n. 20; 14.6%); Law/Criminology: 15 (13.3%; 
2012: n. 15; 10.9%); Literature/Arts/History: 6 (5.3%; 2012: n. 9; 6.6%); 
Economics/Business: 1 (0.9%; 2012: n. 2; 1.5%); Other: 6 (5.3%; 2012: n. 5; 3.6%). 
As indicated in our discussion of findings below, the 2017 survey maintained a 
combination of closed and open-ended questions in order to generate both quantitative and 
qualitative findings. Twelve questions remained the same as the 2012 survey; four questions 
were reformulated; and, four new questions were posed to reflect changes in academic debate 
and empirical events since the initial survey. The questions focused on demographic 
information; definitional issues around terrorism and cyberterrorism; the cyberterrorism 
threat; the appropriateness of particular forms of response to this threat; and ‘state of the 
discipline’ views of current research in this field. In the following, we document our findings 
around three key themes: definitional issues; threat assessments; and matters of response. 
Defining cyberterrorism 
Questions one to six of the 2017 survey focused on definitional issues. The first three of these 
used a five-point Likert scale, asking respondents the extent to which they believed the 
definitional issues around terrorism in general have been resolved (where 1 was “Not at all” 
and 5 was “Entirely”); how important they considered the resolution of the definitional issues 
around terrorism (where 1 was “Not at all” and 5 was “Very important”) and how necessary 
they believed a specific definition of cyberterrorism (where 1 was “Of no use” and 5 was 
“Essential”). For each question, respondents were asked to enter two scores: one in respect of 
policymakers and another in respect of researchers. There was also a free text box for 
respondents to add any additional comments. The mean scores are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: the significance of the definitional issues surrounding terrorism and cyberterrorism, 
in respect of policymakers and researchers 
 
 Mean scores (Scale responses: 1-5) 
Policymakers Researchers 
2012 2017 2012 2017 
To what extent have the definitional 
issues around terrorism in general been 
satisfactorily resolved? 
2.41 2.36 2.82 2.58 
How important is, or was, the 
resolution of the definitional issues 
around terrorism? 
3.71 3.80 3.61 3.62 
How necessary do you believe a 
specific definition of cyberterrorism to 
be? 
3.73 3.88 3.51 3.83 
 
(The response rates for the individual questions ranged from 97% to 98% in 2017, and from 
94% to 100% in 2012) 
 
As Table 1 demonstrates, for all three questions the mean scores in 2017 in respect of 
policymakers were similar to those in 2012. The slight decrease in respect of the first 
question (from 2.41 to 2.36) and slight increase in respect of the other two (from 3.71 and 
3.79 to 3.81 and 3.88 respectively) are not statistically significant. According to our 
respondents, then, the definitional issues around terrorism in general and cyberterrorism in 
particular remain as important to policymakers as they were five years ago but are no closer 
to being resolved. 
In terms of researchers, the mean score for the second question was almost identical 
to five years ago (3.615 compared to 3.608 in 2012). Importantly, however, whilst the 
decrease for the first question (from 2.82 to 2.58) approached, but did not reach, statistical 
significance (t (241) = 1.748, p = .082), the increase for the third question (from 3.51 to 3.83) 
is statistically significant, t (239) = -2.263, p = .025. Our respondents thus indicated not only 
that, for researchers, the definitional issues around terrorism in general remain as important 
as five years ago and are no closer to being resolved, but also that a specific definition of 
cyberterrorism is more necessary now than it was then. 
In their entries in the free text box, respondents to the 2017 survey offered reasons for 
the importance of definitional clarity. In respect of researchers, the principal reason was 
analytic clarity. As one respondent stated, without a clearly articulated definition of terrorism, 
research into the topic descends into a “largely amorphous mass of competing assumptions 
based on a shifting base” (R7041). In respect of policymakers, the principal reason concerned 
delimiting the scope of terrorism-related powers. Here, definitional clarity is seen to guide 
policymakers’ decision-making, including decisions about where to direct funding, and 
guards against the creation and misapplication of overly broad state powers, including the 
power to prosecute. Some respondents also pointed out that definitional clarity is valuable in 
facilitating exchanges between the research and policymaker communities. 
At the same time, it should be noted that a significant number of respondents 
expressed skepticism about efforts to define terrorism and/or cyberterrorism. First, some 
queried the value of the term cyberterrorism itself. One respondent described it as 
“anachronistic” (R7036), whilst another regarded it as unnecessary: “A proper, strategic 
definition of terrorism would cover cyberterrorism. The vehicle of delivery is irrelevant to the 
definition” (R7015). Another suggested that a clear definition of cyberterrorism would 
involve some sacrifice of flexibility, in that it would restrict the ability of the term to 
encompass “possible epiphanies of cyberterrorism”, i.e., previously unforeseen types of 
incident (R7062). Second, some opined that the (mis)use of the terms terrorism and 
cyberterrorism is a greater problem than the construction of a satisfactory definition. For 
example, one respondent suggested that definitional clarity is unattainable because 
policymakers wish to retain maximum “rhetorical ambiguity” (R7098), whist another stated 
that policymakers and researchers alike “continue to subvert the already established 
scientifically valid definition” for political motives (R7095). And, third, there were some 
respondents that doubted whether there is any value in seeking to construct unambiguous 
definitions in the first place, stating, for example, that “Language is too fluid to nail down” 
(R7080). 
Questions four and five sought respondents’ views on the defining features of 
cyberterrorism. Question four asked respondents to select, from a list of ten items, those 
characteristics that they considered to be important elements of cyberterrorism. The results are 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: which of the following are important elements of cyberterrorism? 
 
(The response rates for this question were 99% in 2017 and 97% in 2012) 
Two key points emerge from Figure 1. First, for a majority of respondents there are three 
important distinguishing features of cyberterrorism: a political or ideological motive; digital 
means or target; and, fear as an outcome. These same three features were identified by a 
majority of respondents in 2012. It is worth noting that, whereas in 2012 87% of respondents 
opined that a political or ideological motive is an important element of cyberterrorism, in 
2017 this figure increased to 100%, representing a significant increase, χ2(1) = 14.985, p < 
.001. The second key point, however, is that, notwithstanding this consensus regarding the 
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Fear as an outcome
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other possible distinguishing features. Not only is opinion split as to whether an act must 
result in physical harm to people or property in order to qualify as an instance of 
cyberterrorism, there are also a number of other possible distinguishing features (such as 
targeting civilians, perpetrated by non-state actors, and conducted by a group or organization) 
that were considered important by a sizeable minority of respondents. 
Question five offered respondents the opportunity to identify (in a free text box) any 
important elements of cyberterrorism they felt were missing from the list provided in 
question four. A total of 48 respondents took up this opportunity (response rate: 39%), with 
four items being identified by at least three respondents. These were: targets critical 
infrastructure (eight respondents); state sponsored, supported or perpetrated (eight 
respondents); intention to coerce or compel a target audience (four respondents); and, other 
targets, e.g., government, military, economic and financial targets (three respondents). This is 
very similar to the 2012 results, in which four items were also identified by three or more 
respondents in response to this question, including the first three items above. The difference 
between the two years was that the fourth most common response in 2017 (other targets) was 
not amongst the answers offered five years earlier, whereas the fourth most common 
response in 2012 (demonstration of perpetrator skill/capability) was not offered in 2017.   
The divergent understandings of cyberterrorism evidenced in the previous two 
paragraphs – at least at the penumbra of the term, if not its core – are also illustrated by the 
responses to question six. The equivalent question in the 2012 survey set out eight different 
combinations of digital or physical preparation, means and target and asked respondents 
whether each combination did constitute cyberterrorism, could potentially constitute 
cyberterrorism, or did not constitute cyberterrorism. Given the reservations expressed by 
some respondents five years ago,38 we reformulated this question for the 2017 survey. 
Question six accordingly set out six hypothetical scenarios and asked respondents whether or 
not each scenario constituted cyberterrorism (with the additional option to select “Don’t 
know”). The results are shown in Table 2. 
 










1. A terrorist group interferes with an air 
traffic control system, causing two 
passenger aircraft to collide in mid-air 
81.5% 6.5% 12.1% 
2. Tensions between two communities 
boil over, resulting in violent rioting. 
Several people are killed. A terrorist 
group seeks to further inflame the 
situation. Posing as members of one of 
the communities, they post gruesome 
images and videos on social media and 
issue threats against members of the other 
community. 
29.8% 61.3% 8.9% 
3. A terrorist group remotely accesses the 
processing control systems of a cereal 
manufacturer and changes the level of 
iron supplement. As a result, large 
numbers of children fall ill, and some die. 
81.3% 9.8% 8.9% 
4. A terrorist group hacks into the 
computer system of the nation’s stock 
exchange, sending the national economy 
into chaos and causing significant 
economic damage. 
76.6% 10.5% 12.9% 
5. A terrorist group plants a bomb in the 
computer control room of the nation’s 
stock exchange. Although no-one is 
killed, the computers are destroyed, 
sending the national economy into chaos 
and causing significant economic 
damage. 
29.0% 63.7% 7.3% 
6. A terrorist group plans to hijack a 
plane and crash it into a busy urban area. 
They buy their flight tickets online. 
6.5% 90.3% 3.2% 
 
(The response rate for this question was 100%, with the exception of the third scenario where 
it was 99.2%) 
 
As Table 2 shows, for some of the scenarios there was a high degree of consensus 
amongst our respondents, if not unanimous agreement. 90.3% agreed that scenario six did not 
constitute cyberterrorism (suggesting that, in contrast to more expansive conceptions, most 
researchers do not consider acts of digital preparation to be sufficient for an attack to qualify 
as cyberterrorism39). In contrast, 81.5% and 81.3% believed that scenarios one and three 
respectively did constitute cyberterrorism. These respondents emphasized that in both 
scenarios the perpetrators had caused serious physical harm via digital means. Yet there were 
dissenting voices. For scenario one, 12.1% of respondents said that they did not know 
whether the scenario constituted cyberterrorism or not. The most common reasons for this 
response were: first, that the wording of the question did not specify the nature of the 
interference with the air traffic control system (as one respondent remarked, “What does 
interfere mean? Mess with software or blows it up with a bomb?” (R7102)); and, second, that 
it would depend on the intention and motive of the perpetrators. A further 6.5% of 
respondents stated that the scenario did not constitute cyberterrorism. The most common 
reason was that the attack targeted human life – not a digital system or critical infrastructure 
– and so should be regarded as terrorism, not cyberterrorism. Turning to scenario three, the 
most common reasons offered by the 8.9% of respondents unsure whether this scenario 
constituted cyberterrorism were: first, that it would depend on whether the terrorist group 
publicly communicated what they had done; and, second, that it would depend on the 
perpetrators’ intention and motive. The 9.8% of respondents that felt that this scenario did not 
constitute cyberterrorism also emphasized uncertainty over the perpetrators’ motive. Some 
also suggested that the scenario would be better understood as an instance of (industrial) 
sabotage or cybercrime. 
An even more confused picture emerges when looking at the other three scenarios. In 
response to scenario five, 63.7% opined that it did not constitute cyberterrorism, whereas 
29.0% felt that it did. The latter highlighted that the attack had a digital target (the computer 
network of a nation’s stock exchange) (e.g., “Attacking cyber, even with kinetic means, can 
be cyberterrorism” (R7084)), whereas the former emphasized that a physical, not digital, 
means of attack was employed (a bomb) (e.g., “Explosives are not cyber means. It would be a 
terrorist action but not a cyberterrorist one” (R7006)). Opinion was similarly split in response 
to scenario two. 29.8% opined that this scenario constituted cyberterrorism, emphasizing that 
digital means (social media) had been used to instigate violence and instill fear. In contrast, 
61.3% stated that the scenario did not constitute cyberterrorism. A number of these 
respondents pointed out that, whilst the terrorist group had used social media, their actions 
fell short of a (cyber)terrorist attack. Such actions instead – in the view of these respondents – 
constituted an “information campaign” (R7017), “propaganda” (R7034), “advertising” 
(R7010) or “incitement” (7025). 
Lastly, in response to scenario four, 76.6% of respondents stated that it did constitute 
cyberterrorism, whereas 10.5% said that it did not. The latter emphasized that, whilst the 
perpetrators had hacked into the nation’s stock exchange and caused significant economic 
damage, their actions did not result in physical harm to people or property. Similarly, several 
of the 12.9% of respondents that said that they did not know whether the scenario amounted 
to cyberterrorism or not also pointed to the consequences of the perpetrators’ actions, stating 
that they would need more information about the “chaos” caused to the national economy to 
be able to classify the incident. In contrast, a number of the respondents that believed that the 
scenario did constitute cyberterrorism highlighted the economic harm caused by the 
perpetrators. This is noteworthy, given that – as we saw above in response to question four – 
50% of respondents identified violence against people or property as an important element of 
cyberterrorism. A considerable proportion of respondents were thus willing to classify this 
scenario as cyberterrorism notwithstanding their contradictory response to the earlier 
question. 
Taken together, the responses to these definitional questions highlight that despite 
continuing disagreement around its utility there appears to be increasing academic 
convergence on some of the term’s core characteristics. Thus, if debate continues around the 
importance, for instance, of digital harm or civilian targets, for our respondents at least there 
is significant and growing agreement on definitional issues relating to motivation and wider 
societal consequences. This consensus might be indicative of this discussion’s maturity; a 
sense that the key definitional issues and fault lines have now been mapped out. Indeed, it 
might also be as close as we can come to resolving this definitional question, for – as Alex 
Schmid argues of the term ‘terrorism’ more widely: “a full consensus will never be reached. 
Yet what we can hope for is that a majority of academic analysts can agree on the core 
elements. There will always be borderline cases where honest people can disagree.”40  
This convergence around cyberterrorism’s core features poses important implications 
for academic discussion. In the first instance, it potentially diminishes the significance of the 
longstanding debate between ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ understandings of this term.41 Such 
positions – read through the lens of our survey, at least – concern the concept’s reach, rather 
than its essence, with a minimal, core understanding of cyberterrorism potentially compatible 
with each of these. Focusing on this common core understanding may also bear fruit for 
another – relational – question of definition that runs through this debate, which is: how is 
cyberterrorism similar to, and/or different from, other phenomena (such as other forms of 
violence or other online behaviors). Although our survey only allows limited comparison 
with other cyberthreats, if cyberterrorism’s core can be identified with sufficient specificity – 
as, potentially, indicated by the above – it might, for instance, be possible to differentiate 
cyberterrorism from other, ostensibly similar, phenomena. If moving toward resolution of 
these questions through identification of core characteristics is likely to involve a level of 
abstraction or simplicity some will find unsatisfactory, it does signal (some) hope for a 
usable, or ‘good enough’, definition of this term,42 with all of the benefits for academic 
debate, policymaking and political critique this may bring.43 Such a resolution might also, 
indeed, have implications for our understanding of second order questions around 
cyberterrorism’s threat, and – indeed – appropriate responses to this threat. Yet, as indicated 
now below, this is less straightforward than one might expect. 
Assessing the cyberterrorism threat 
Questions seven to thirteen of our survey focused on threat assessment. Question twelve 
asked respondents whether, in their opinion, the threat level presented by cyberterrorism had 
changed in the past five years. Respondents were able to select from one of four options: 
decreased; stayed the same; increased; or, don’t know. The results are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: In your opinion, has the cyberterrorism threat level changed in the last five years? 
 
(The response rate for this question was 96.8%) 
Decreased, 1%
Stayed the same, 14%
Increased, 80%
Don't know, 5%
As Figure 2 shows, a large majority (80.0%) believed that the cyberterrorism threat level had 
increased in the five-year period from 2012 to 2017. Just one of the 120 respondents that 
answered this question thought the threat level had decreased (0.8%); all other respondents 
selected either stayed the same (14.2%) or don’t know (5.0%).  
The general view that the threat posed by cyberterrorism had increased during this 
period was also evident in responses to question seven. This question required respondents to 
assess the seriousness of the threat, by asking: in your view, does cyberterrorism constitute a 
significant threat? Respondents entered their answers in a free text box. After reviewing the 
responses, a total of six coding categories were created: yes; a threat, but not a significant 
one; possibly/potentially a significant threat; not yet, but could be in the future; no; and, 
other. The frequency of these is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: In your view, does cyberterrorism constitute a significant threat? 
 
(The response rate for this question was 94.4%) 
 
Yes, 66.7%
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In the 2012 survey, 57.2% of respondents answered yes in response to this question, 
whilst 20.0% answered no. As Figure 3 shows, in 2017 the proportion of respondents that 
answered yes increased to 66.7% and the proportion of respondents that answered no 
decreased to 12.0%. Although both of these were sizeable changes, neither the increase in 
affirmative responses (χ2(1) = 1.399, p = .237) nor the decrease in negative ones (χ2(1) = 
2.173, p = .140) reached statistical significance.44 A number of those respondents who 
answered yes pointed to a growing dependence on cyber (including the Internet of Things) 
and/or vulnerabilities in existing systems. For example, one commented: “The combination 
of increased risk as more elements of our society become cyber-related and the lack of 
security as shown by recent successful malware attacks indicate that this is a significant risk” 
(R7064). In contrast, those who answered no tended to focus instead on whether terrorist 
groups have the capacity needed to commit a cyberterrorist attack. For example, one stated 
“Not for the moment considering the capacities of most terrorist groups” (R7049), whilst 
another remarked that “So far, at least, terrorists lack the capability to carry out what I would 
consider to be true cyberterrorism” (R7052). 
In the 2012 survey, three further coding categories were created besides yes and no: 
possibly/potentially (11.8% of respondents); unsure (5.5%); and, other (5.5%). To reflect 
respondents’ answers to the 2017 survey as closely as possible, it was necessary to refine this 
list.45 A total of 5.1% of respondents opined that cyberterrorism is not yet a significant threat 
but could be in the future. One, for example, said “Not at the moment. It probably will in the 
future, but we are not there yet” (R7050). A further 6.0% stated that cyberterrorism is 
possibly, or potentially, a significant threat. In contrast to the not yet responses, the 
possibly/potentially responses suggested that the threat of cyberterrorism is a present one, 
albeit one that has not yet materialized. As one respondent stated, “A significant potential 
threat. It has not really been operationalized by groups and individuals yet” (R7058). 
Meanwhile, some respondents (7.7%) considered cyberterrorism to be a threat, but not a 
significant one. Some of these respondents explained their answer by comparing the threat of 
cyberterrorism to other cyber threats (such as “cyber-enhanced interstate conflict or 
cybersabotage” (R7011)) or other forms of terrorism that they regarded as posing a graver 
threat (e.g., “Cyberterrorism constitutes a threat, but not a significant one. Probability of 
other attack forms (mass shootings, IEDs, suicide attacks) is more likely” (R7064)). Others 
offered an alternative, lesser description than significant (e.g., “Between medium to high, but 
not significant at this juncture” (R7020); “I’d say it constitutes a slight threat – or some 
description in between slight and significant. It's a low to moderate problem” (R7034)). 
Question eight built on the previous question by asking: If so, against whom or what 
is the threat focused? Again, a free text box was provided for respondents. The response rate 
was 74.2%. There was a total of four different threat referents identified by ten or more 
respondents: governments/states (28 respondents); critical infrastructures/computer networks 
(26 respondents); civilians/individuals (26 respondents); and, organizations/private 
sector/economy/corporations (19 respondents). This is very similar to the responses received 
in the 2012 survey, in which governments/states (23 respondents), followed by critical 
infrastructures/computer networks (19 respondents) and then civilians/individuals and 
organizations/private sector/corporations/economy (10 respondents each) were the most 
commonly cited referents or targets.  
Questions nine, ten and eleven were new questions not included in the 2012 survey. 
Each sought to probe a different aspect of respondents’ perception of the cyberterrorist threat: 
actors; origins; and, vulnerabilities. Question nine asked respondents to specify the threat 
level (none, low, medium, or high) posed by four different types of actor: individuals; 
criminal organizations; terrorist organizations; and, states. Respondents were also given the 
opportunity to specify any other actors not represented in the question. The results are shown 
in Figure 4. 
 





As Figure 4 shows, respondents not only implicitly recognized that states may engage in 
cyberterrorism – something explicitly addressed in the 2012 survey46 – they also felt that 





























with a further 15.1% stating medium threat and only 5.9% answering low threat. In the view 
of our respondents, then, states pose a significantly greater threat than terrorist organizations; 
less than half (47.5%) of respondents believed that terrorist organizations pose a high threat 
of cyberterrorism. The lowest threat levels were associated with criminal organizations 
(where the most common response was medium threat (43.3%)) and individuals (most 
common response: low threat (46.2%)). In terms of other actors, the most common responses 
were “groups” or “networks” of individuals (five respondents) and hacktivists (four 
respondents). Five respondents also declined to name specific actors, commenting on the 
difficulty or futility of attempting to do so given the nature of cyberterrorism. 
Questions ten and eleven asked respondents from where in the world cyberterrorism 
is most likely to emerge, and where in the world is most vulnerable to cyberterrorism. For 
both questions a free text box was provided. Responses were categorized into five groups, 
which are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Anticipated origins of and vulnerabilities to cyberterrorist attacks 
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Russia 31 (25.0%) United States 20 (16.1%) 
China 16 (12.9%) China 3 (2.4%) 
North Korea 8 (6.5%) Russia 3 (2.4%) 
United States 6 (4.8%) Canada 2 (1.6%) 
Israel 3 (2.4%) Japan 2 (1.6%) 
























Anywhere/everywhere 27 (21.8%) The West/Western 
countries 
11 (8.9%) 
Middle East 13 (10.5%) Anywhere/everywhere 10 (8.1%) 
Asia 4 (3.2%) Europe/the EU 9 (7.3%) 
Soviet Union or Eastern 
Europe 
4 (3.2%) Western Europe 5 (4.0%) 
The West 4 (3.2%) North America 3 (2.4%) 

















States (no further 
qualification) 
7 (5.7%) References to states 
indicating a positive 
development status 
4 (3.2%) 
Non-state 2 (1.6%) References to states 
indicating a negative 
development status 
3 (2.4%) 
Rogue states 2 (1.6%)  























s Terrorist(s) 5 (4.0%)  
ISIS 3 (2.4%) 
Islam/Islamic 3 (2.4%) 
Al-Qaeda 2 (1.6%) 



































Developed places 3 (2.4%) Developed places 11 (8.9%) 
Developing places 3 (2.4%) Dependent places 8 (6.5%) 
Places facing conflict 2 (1.6%) Reliant on networks 6 (4.8%) 
 Connected places 5 (4.0%) 
Developing places 5 (4.0%) 







Includes advanced 3 (2.4%) 
References economy 3 (2.4%) 
References networks 3 (2.4%) 
Democracies 2 (1.6%) 
The Third World 2 (1.6%) 
 
(The response rates for these questions were 83.0% and 79.8% respectively. Only those 
responses that were mentioned by two or more respondents are displayed). 
 
In terms of from cyberterrorism’s likely geographical origins, a significant proportion 
of respondents answered anywhere or everywhere (21.8%). Of those that offered specific 
countries or regions, the most common answers were Russia (25.0%), China (12.9%), the 
Middle East (10.5%) and North Korea (6.5%). In keeping with the responses to question 
nine, a number of respondents also offered a state-related descriptor. As well as simply the 









respondents); state-supported (two respondents); state-related (one respondent); and, states 
with terrorism (one respondent).  
In terms of vulnerability to cyberterrorism, although a number of respondents (8.1%) 
again stated anywhere and everywhere, others focused on levels of national development. 
These generally emphasized either a state’s developed (8.9%) or positive development status 
(3.2%) or its dependence on digital systems (e.g., dependent places (6.5%), reliant on 
networks (4.8%), connected places (4.0%)), but there were also a small number of responses 
that emphasized a state’s developing (4.0%) or negative development status (2.4%). Of those 
that offered specific countries or regions, the most common answers were the United States 
(16.1%), the West (8.9%), Europe/the EU (7.3%) and Western Europe (4.0%).  
Question thirteen (which also appeared in the 2012 survey), finally, asked respondents 
whether, in light of their previous answers, they considered a cyberterrorist attack has ever 
taken place. Respondents were able to select either yes, no or don’t know, with a free text 
box for elaboration. Figure 5 compares the responses from the two years. 
 
Figure 5: With reference to your previous responses, do you consider that a cyberterrorist 
attack has ever taken place? 
 
 










Whilst opinion had been equally split in 2012, in 2017 a majority (64.7%) considered 
that a cyberterrorist attack has taken place, which was significantly higher, χ2(1) = 5.324, p = 
.021. In their explanations, respondents identified a total of 26 different incidents that they 
regarded as instances of cyberterrorism. Seven of these incidents were mentioned by two or 
more respondents.47 They were: Stuxnet (eight respondents); attacks on Ukraine (five 
respondents); WannaCry ransomware (five respondents); attacks on Estonia (four 
respondents); interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election (three respondents); Petya 
ransomware (two respondents); and, attack on TV5Monde (two respondents). It should be 
pointed out, however, that in the eyes of some of our respondents it is contestable whether 
these incidents do in fact constitute examples of cyberterrorism. Indeed, some respondents 
expressly mentioned several of these incidents to explain why there has not yet been a true 
instance of cyberterrorism. For example, one remarked “I don’t think any of the cases that we 
know of, e.g., Estonia, Stuxnet, ransomware, identity theft, and the 2016 US election are 
examples of cyberterrorism” (R7001). In the opinion of these respondents, examples like 
those listed above lack at least one important feature of cyberterrorism. Six respondents 
observed that cyberattacks to date have been committed by perpetrators lacking the intention 
to create terror and/or a political motive; five respondents stated that cyberattacks to date 
have not resulted in violence against people or property; four commented that cyberattacks to 
date have not been severe enough to qualify as cyberterrorism; and, three said that 
cyberattacks to date have not been perpetrated by non-state actors.  
Just as the above discussion of definitional matters indicated some measure of 
convergence around cyberterrorism’s core characteristics, here we find (even greater) 
convergence on this question of threat amongst the global research community. 
Cyberterrorism – as seen above – is now widely seen as a significant threat to various 
referents. And, indeed, very widely seen as a threat that has increased in the five years since 
our original survey. Notwithstanding important instances of dissent and disagreement noted 
above, when the responses to our questions are combined, we encounter a dominant 
construction of cyberterrorism’s most threatening incarnation as: (i) a state-led activity, (ii) 
potentially emanating from anywhere, but (iii) with especial risk posed by Russia, China, 
North Korea and the Middle East, and (iv) with the greatest vulnerability being found in 
developed states heavily reliant on digital systems, (v) in particular the United States, Europe 
or the West more broadly. 
This increasing researcher concern with the threat posed by cyberterrorism is 
noteworthy, in part, because it does not – as indicated above – appear to stem from empirical 
developments in the years between our two surveys. Many of the most widely cited examples 
of cyberterrorism from our 2017 survey pre-dated our initial, 2012, research (Stuxnet, and the 
cyber-attacks in Estonia and Ukraine). Indeed, occurrences that had taken place in the 
intervening period received only twelve mentions in total in the 2017 survey. It might, 
perhaps, be the case that those earlier events either continue to resonate as very contemporary 
(perhaps because of continuing media and academic attention) and are therefore still taken as 
indicative of current or future threats. Alternatively, it might be the case that more recent, if 
lower profile, events have served to augment more generalized perceptions of threat, even if 
earlier, more noteworthy, events such as Stuxnet are the ones which come to mind when 
examples are sought from researchers. Alternatively still, and perhaps counter-intuitively, it 
might even be the case that the very absence of obvious cyberterrorist attacks in the years 
surrounding our surveys is interpreted as evidence of a growing threat. To borrow Joseba 
Zulaika’s argument of terrorism more broadly, concern with cyberterrorism might represent 
an instance in which “the most ominous sign is the absence of a sign, which only confirms 
that this has to be simply the lull before the storm. It can only be the silence of the enemy 
while plotting the unknown sudden attack.”48 
Two additional explanations for a growing concern with the threat posed by 
cyberterrorism relate to epistemological rather than empirical developments in the years 
between our surveys. It might be the case that some of the more prominent examples - or the 
significance thereof for inferences around the future of cyberterrorism (such as, perhaps the 
Stuxnet attack, or the attacks in Estonia) – were less familiar to respondents of our earlier 
survey than those who completed its 2017 incarnation. Alternatively, it might be the case that 
the meaning and significance of those earlier events is now being reconsidered in light of new 
academic understandings or norms. The re-interpretation of past events is, of course, 
commonplace, witnessed in recent debates around the parameters of sexual harassment in 
light of the #metoo movement, and – indeed – periodic public discussions about the need for 
contemporary apologies for historical wrongs such as colonialism or slavery. It might, 
therefore, be the case that events not previously entering cyberterrorism’s discursive orbit are 
now treated as such due to transformations in understandings of this threat, with implications 
for assessments of the present/future threat that it poses. Although our survey findings cannot 
confirm or repudiate such explanations, there is a tension here with the definitional questions 
discussed in the preceding section which appeared to point to a convergence around 
cyberterrorism’s core characteristics, rather than new or unusual ways of reworking our 
understanding of this term to facilitate its stretching. 
A third form of explanation – not incompatible with some of the above – is that a 
growing researcher concern around cyberterrorism represents a response neither to empirical 
or epistemological developments, but rather to a growing securitization of this threat in the 
intervening period. A range of studies have explored the processes to which cyberterrorism 
and related threats have been securitized – by which we mean depicted or constructed as 
exceptional threats to security – in media discourse, political language, popular culture and 
beyond.49 As Myriam Dunn Cavelty puts it, in an exploration of US cybersecurity discourse:  
The cyber-terror frame as a sub-theme of the general cyber-threats frame combines two 
of the great fears of the late 20th century: The fear of random and violent victimization 
and the distrust or outright fear of computer technology, which both feed on the fear of 
the unknown (Pollitt, 1997). Terrorism is feared, and is meant to be feared, because it is 
perceived as being random, incomprehensible, and uncontrollable. Technology, 
including information technology, is feared because it is seen as complex, abstract, and 
arcane in its impact on individuals.50 
This widespread securitization of cyberterrorism – and other cyber threats – is not limited to 
the time period of our surveys but there might again be a temporal lag at work here. Such an 
explanation also, of course, displaces rather than resolves the underpinning explanatory 
question (why is cyberterrorism being constructed as such a significant threat anywhere?). 
Yet, if this securitization is part of the explanation for growing researcher concern, then we 
might also expect to see recommendations on how best to respond to this threat situated 
within a similarly securitized logic of exceptionalism, rather than more moderate, banal 
practices of normal politics and routine security. The following section turns precisely to this 
question. 
Responding to the cyberterrorism threat 
The final three questions of our survey focused on issues of response. Question fourteen 
asked respondents: in your view, what are the most effective countermeasures against 
cyberterrorism? Answers were entered into a free text box. Figure 6 shows the sixteen 
countermeasures that were mentioned by at least three respondents. 
 




(The response rate for this question was 79.0%). 
 
The same question appeared in the 2012 survey. As in 2012, by far the most common 
response was target-hardening (37.6% in 2012; 48.0% in 2017). Five more of the 
countermeasures shown in Figure 6 also appeared in the top twelve responses received in 
2012: greater intelligence; international cooperation; public-private partnership;51 tackling the 
root causes of terrorism;52 and, more research. However, there were also some notable 
differences between the two sets of responses. First, the respondents to the 2017 survey 
produced a much longer list of countermeasures. In the 2012 survey there were 93 
























Tackling the root causes of terrorism
Security management procedures






Greater investment in infrastructure/expertise
Better monitoring and accountability of digital
defence systems
mentioned by two or more respondents. In contrast, in the 2017 survey there were 98 
respondents who answered this question and a total of twenty-four countermeasures that were 
mentioned by two or more respondents.53 Arguably, this more extensive list of 
countermeasures reflects the attention that the topic received during the five years between 
the surveys. Second, when examining the countermeasures that were identified in 2017 but 
not five years earlier, certain themes emerge. One of these is the importance of the human 
factor. In addition to the second most common response – training and education (18.4%) – 
respondents also mentioned personal responsibility/vigilance (7.1%), awareness-raising 
(4.1%) and good cyber hygiene (4.1%). Another theme was the importance of regulation, 
with respondents mentioning security management procedures (5.1%), international 
law/norms (4.1%) and better monitoring and accountability of digital defense systems 
(3.1%). These themes supplement those of resilience/prevention, intelligence, cooperation 
and collaboration and addressing the root causes of terrorism that were evident in both 2012 
and 2017. 
Question fifteen asked respondents to identify the most pressing issues in the realm of 
cyberterrorism for policymakers, whilst question sixteen asked them to identify the major 
limitations, gaps, or weaknesses within academic research into cyberterrorism. For each 
question, a free text box was provided for answers. Table 4 shows the most common 
responses.  
 
Table 4: Most pressing issues facing policymakers and researchers 
 
What are the most pressing issues in the 
realm of cyberterrorism for policymakers? 
What are the major limitations, gaps, or 
weaknesses within academic research into 
cyberterrorism? 
Resilience/protection of critical 
infrastructure and the Internet of 
Things  
19.4% Access to data 30.9% 
New national and international 
laws, norms and regulations 
14.0% Lack of definitional consensus 14.4% 






Educating the public and 
policymakers 
8.6% Lack of financial support/resources 9.3% 
Defining cyberterrorism 7.5% 
Need a better understanding of 
whether terrorist groups plan to 
commit cyberterrorist attacks (and 
what might cause them to do so) 
7.2% 
Coordination and collaboration 
across different jurisdictions and 
stakeholders 
7.5% 
Some researchers exaggerate the 
threat/the issue does not exist 
7.2% 
Conducting threat assessments 6.5% Lack of cyber knowledge 6.2% 
State activities in cyberspace 4.3% 
Lack of government and industry 
collaboration with academia 
5.2% 
Anonymity and attribution 4.3% 
Weak theoretical/conceptual 
analysis/research tends to be too 
descriptive 
4.1% 
The human factor/individuals’ 
poor security practices online 
3.2% 
Existing research is insufficiently 
practical 
2.1% 
Provision of training 3.2% Lack of a focus on vulnerabilities 2.1% 
Responding to the threat whilst 




Keeping pace with technology 2.2% 
Developing effective protocols 2.2% 
Reorganising governmental 
structures and defence systems  
2.2% 
 
(The response rates for these questions were 75.0% and 78.2% respectively. Only those 
responses that were mentioned by two or more respondents are displayed) 
 
As Table 4 shows, the most common response to question fifteen was resilience/protection of 
critical infrastructure and the Internet of Things (19.4%). This was also the most common 
response to this question in 2012. In fact, six of the seven most common responses in 2017 
also featured amongst the seven most common responses in 2012.54 Beyond these, and in 
keeping with the answers to question 14, respondents in 2017 also emphasized the 
importance of educating the public and policymakers (8.6%), as well as of training (3.2%) 
and the human factor (3.2%). State activities in cyberspace was also identified as a pressing 
issue for policymakers; this reflects the responses to the threat assessment questions 
discussed above. 
As argued above, findings from our survey indicate that the research community has, 
first, increasingly converged on a core understanding of cyberterrorism, and, second, become 
increasingly concerned with the threat that cyberterrorism poses. If this does indicate a 
growing securitization of this phenomenon, it is interesting that the findings discussed in this 
section demonstrate two features one might not expect. First, is considerable diversity in the 
range of responses identified by respondents, albeit with a far stronger concentration on one 
measure – target-hardening – than in previous years. This diversity might indicate increasing 
researcher literacy around cybersecurity challenges and the range of potential responses that 
may be employed against this threat. Alternatively, it might be connected to the problem’s 
complexity – and the need for a range of technical, legal, and political mechanisms for its 
address.  
It is also interesting – in light of increasing researcher concern with cyberterrorism’s 
threat – that so many suggested responses lack the exceptionality we would typically expect 
when an issue has become successfully securitized. Indeed, there is considerable overlap 
between our survey findings and the recent academic literature discussed at this article’s 
outset in which human responsiveness and cyber hygiene feature prominently. Beyond this 
emphasis on the everyday or banal work of citizens, there is also a considerable emphasis on 
the sorts of ‘normal’ legislative and governmental activity that would accompany resolution 
of any political problem. Thus, if cyberterrorism has become increasingly perceived as a 




The findings in Table 4 above indicate the extent of the challenges still faced by researchers 
working on issues around cyberterrorism. When we asked our respondents about these 
challenges specifically in 2012, by far the most common response we encountered was the 
need for greater definitional or conceptual clarity. In 2017, this was again highlighted by a 
significant proportion of respondents (14.4%), albeit considerably less than five years earlier 
(33.7%). The most common response in 2017 was instead access to data (30.9%). This was 
one of a number of obstacles to research that respondents identified, with others including 
disciplinary boundaries (9.3%), lack of funding and resources (9.3%) and lack of 
collaboration with non-academic stakeholders (5.2%). Other common responses seemed to 
hint at the different disciplinary approaches that respondents felt hinder interdisciplinary 
efforts. These included: lack of cyber knowledge (6.2%), weak theoretical or conceptual 
analysis (4.1%), research being insufficiently practical (2.1%) and a lack of a focus on 
vulnerabilities (2.1%). 
This article represents an attempt to document and to begin to address some of these 
challenges. In so doing, we have sought to show what appear to be significant developments 
within this research community, notably: (i) growing convergence on cyberterrorism’s core 
characteristics; (ii) growing researcher concern with the threat posed by cyberterrorism 
(albeit in the absence of specific instances); and, (iii) support for a wide portfolio of counter-
measures, accompanied by increasing faith in the importance of target-hardening 
mechanisms. We have also sought, simply, to document other findings from aspects of the 
survey that relate, more specifically to questions of definition, threat and response. Although 
our methodology means this article can only offer a comparison of these two surveys, our 
hope is that the findings have value as the first and only effort to capture the development of 
expert opinion on this topic amongst the global research community. 
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